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OPTIMAL REGULATION AND GROWTH IN A 
NATURAL-RESOURCE-BASED ECONOMY 
 







  This paper develops a two-sector model for a renewable natural resource based 
economy. Pareto efficient results show the optimal harvesting rate that allows for 
sustained long-run optimal growth, which is upper-bounded by the biological rate of 
reproduction. Regulation prevents from resource over-exploitation and exhaustion 
which arise under open access. The Ramsey policy allowing the competitive economy 
to reach the first-best solution, leads the government to tax harvesting activity from 
firms and distribute the receipts among households. In the short-run the tax is variable. 
In the long-run, the lower the intrinsic rate of reproduction the higher the constant unit 
tax on the resource use. 
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 1 Introduction
Any introductory textbook places the abundance of resources as a fundamental determi-
nant of long-run growth in an economy. However, diﬀerent works, in particular those with
an empirical approach, suggest that such abundance, when referred to natural resources,
can become, in fact, a signiﬁcant obstacle to the long-run growth (Gylfason et al., 1999;
Gylfason, 2001b). This paradoxical result is not strictly due to the abundance of natural
resources, but to management problems, frequently with political connotations, associated
with the diﬃculty to deﬁne correct property rights and the mechanism for appropriation
of generated rents, in a context where the extractive activity is the cornerstone of the
economy.
In this work, we get away from a pure extractive economy and contextualize the
analysis in a more modern capitalistic economy, where aside with the extractive sector
there is a sector engaged in the production of a ﬁnal consumption good. The basic trait of
our economy is that natural resource is an essential input for the production in the other
sector. In addition, we consider the natural resource as removable, given that renewable
resources are also exhaustible and they allow, like non-renewable resources, to examine
the critical aspects of the relation between resources and growth. These critical aspects
refer to the following recurrent questions. What is the optimal rate at which the resource
must be harvested? Can a natural-resource-based economy experience sustainable long-
run growth? When will extinction occur? How do optimal and competitive behaviour
diﬀer? How can a competitive natural-resource-based economy be regulated in order
to achieve Pareto optimal outcomes? At last, all these questions are intimately related
with the problem of the eﬃcient management of the natural resources, which when, as in
our work, the natural resource is renewable, forces to consider the extraction rate of the
resource in light of its intrinsic regeneration rate.
The topic of eﬃcient management of natural resources has received a lot of attention,
both for renewable resources and for non-renewable resources. It is well-known that under
open-access conditions, property rights are not well-deﬁned. Then, natural resource is
2equally harvested by all extractors and no one is willing to invest in the resource stock
maintenance since the expected beneﬁts associated with the resource units saved by an
individual entrepreneur in one period are likely to be reaped by others in the next (Gordon,
1954; Hardin, 1968). In such a case, the resource stock will be severely depleted and,
consequently, the open-access regime is far to guarantee an eﬃcient resource use and a
path of sustainable growth (Berck, 1979).
The solution of management resource problems requires overcoming the lack of a
property rights system. Aznar and Ruiz-Tamarit (2005) show that, when the resource use
is not under an open-access regime but under private property rights that are uniformly
distributed among families, the competitive equilibrium following an eﬃcient pattern of
resource use is able to provide a sustainable long-run path for the economy. However,
the scope of this work is limited since they ignore the relevance of open-access as starting
point in real world and the speciﬁc practices that can be used to implement the attribution
of property rights.
One way to ensure eﬃcient resource use and sustainable long-run growth is to allocate
property rights over the resource to a sole owner (i. e. a central planner), which decides
about its extraction and use internalizing external eﬀects. Optimal results provided in
this case help to evaluate the eﬃciency reached by alternative allocations of property
rights in private hands, which are of the great interest for us, because the capitalistic
characterization of our economy. In practice, there are only two real options for allocation
of private property rights over natural resource: harvesting transferable quotas, from one
side, and taxes, from the other side. Although both systems, if appropriately chosen, give
the same results in terms of eﬃciency, our attention will be devoted to the utilization
of taxes. This approach could allow us to make pronouncements about the convenience
of using ecotaxes in economies with productive sectors which depend on the exploitation
of natural resources, opening the possibility to do an optimal ﬁscal policy that corrects
market failures and carries competitive results to the social optimum.
In this work, we use an adaptation of the two-sector endogenous growth model formu-
lated by Lucas (1988). Speciﬁcally, we consider a ﬁnal consumption good sector which
3produces a ﬁnal-single good through physical capital and the natural resource, and an ex-
traction sector which provides the renewable natural resource to the ﬁrst one. The paper
is articulated upon the analysis of two diﬀerent scenarios, the central planner case and
the regulated competitive economy, with a brief description of the open-access regime.
For each scenario, we formulate a intertemporal optimization problem and then solve
it applying optimal control techniques through the maximum principle of Pontryagin.
The ﬁrst-order conditions of these dynamical optimization problems conform a non-linear
dynamical Hamiltonian system governing the evolution of the variables in the model. In
this context, the dimension reduction strategy has been widely applied. People deﬁne new
variables as ratios between the variables of the original system in such a way that they
transform the original system into another system with a lower dimension (see Mulligan
and Sala i Martin, 1994; Caballé and Santos, 1993; and Benhabib and Perli, 1994) . Then,
they study this transformed system and look for steady states which will be interpreted
as balanced growth paths for the original system. However, the reduction of dimension
entails a loss of information which may lead to mistakes and miss-interpretations and it
cannot serve to fully characterize the dynamics of the original variables in level. For this
reason, in this work we apply a new resolution technique recently developed by Boucekkine
and Tamarit (2004b). Moreover, we will use Gauss hypergeometric functions to obtain an
explicit representation of the equilibrium dynamics of the variables in level. The results
obtained show that such functions might be most useful in the assessment of the transition
dynamics and asymptotics of endogenous growth models.
Our ﬁrst scenario, corresponding to the case of a central planner, allows us to explicit
the conditions for both a socially optimal allocation and a sustained and sustainable
long-run endogenous growth. The broad picture of the open-access regime helps us to
send light over the problems of overexploitation and, eventually, exhaustion of natural
resource. In the second scenario, the regulated competitive economy, we analyze the
possibility of recovering the eﬃcient results provided for the social planner case through
taxes over the resource use. The study of this third scenario is approached by formulating
a dynamic Ramsey problem, which will be solved through the primal approach based
4upon the choice of quantities. The results concerning the optimality of dynamic taxation
could be easily applied in order to elucidate if market failures that usually accompany the
resource management can be solved by public intervention.
The article is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe initially the economy and
introduce the assumptions featuring a general equilibrium two-sector growth model. One
sector is devoted to purely extractive activities concerning a renewable resource, while the
other sector is devoted to produce a ﬁnal consumption good using both physical capital as
the renewable resource. Then, we solve the dynamical system provided by the ﬁrst-order
conditions and obtain explicitly the optimal paths for the implied variables. Section 3
starts with a brief description of the standard open-access model, in order to evidence the
forces that may cause resource exhaustion. After this we present a model of a regulated
economy, where the possibility to recover optimal solutions, in terms of resource use and
sustained growth, is studied through the formulation of a dynamic Ramsey problem.
Finally, section 4 presents some general conclusions of the work.
2 The socially optimal resources allocation model
2.1 The model
We consider a two-sector closed economy populated by many identical and inﬁnitely lived
rational agents. Population is assumed constant and denoted by N. Individual preferences
are deﬁned over the real per capita consumption of an aggregate single-good at date t,





In this economy, as in Aznar and Ruiz-Tamarit (2005), there is a renewable natural
resource or natural capital, denoted by Q(t), which plays an essential role as input. The
stock of this natural capital changes over time because of two ﬂows having opposite
eﬀects. First, beyond any human intervention, the natural resource grows exponentially
at a constant intrinsic rate δ>0. Second, the natural resource is subject to an extraction
5process, or harvesting activity, because it is required to produce the ﬁnal good. We deﬁne
z (t) as the aggregate extraction rate with z (t) ∈ [0,1],a n dzi (t) as the extraction rate of
the individual ﬁrm. If we consider all ﬁr m sa si d e n t i c a la n ds h a r i n gt h es a m eo b j e c t i v e s ,
a n df o rt h es a k eo fs i m p l i c i t yw ea s s u m et h es a m en u m b e ro fﬁr m sa sc o n s u m e r s ,w eg e t
z(t)=
PN
i=1 zi(t)=Nzi(t). Finally, we assume a linear harvesting function with the
marginal product of eﬀort being equal to the average one. This implies that the resource
stock diminishes, each period, by the amount z (t)Q(t).
The extraction rate is an endogenous variable, which has a direct eﬀect on the op-
portunity set for present and future consumption. When the resource is harvested for
too long at a rate exceeding its regeneration capability, the stock of natural capital will
decrease over time. So, even if natural capital is a biologically renewable resource, this
does not mean that it should be economically inexhaustible. In fact, there is a crucial dif-
ference between physical and natural capital: while the ﬁr s to n em a yb eu s e dr e p e a t e d l y
without any consequence on its available quantity, because only depreciation can reduce
it, the second one disappears automatically from the stock as it is used for production.
Combining the two previous ﬂo w sw eo b t a i nt h el a wo fm o t i o n 1
•
Q(t)=δ(1 − z(t))Q(t) − z (t)Q(t).( 2 )
In the ﬁnal single-good sector, production is ensured by many identical competitive
ﬁrms with technology represented by a Cobb-Douglas function Yi = AK
β
i (ziQ)
1−β.P r o -
duction, Yi, depends positively on the stock of physical capital, Ki,a sw e l la so nt h e
amount of natural resource that is harvested, destroyed, or transformed each period ziQ.2
Aggregating over ﬁrms, given that Y (t)=
PN
i=1 Yi(t)=NYi(t) and K(t)=
PN
i=1 Ki(t)=
1This law of motion does not depart so dramatically from the logistic law, more commonly used in
the literature. As Brander and Taylor (1997) points out “(in the logistic case) the proportional growth
rate would be approximately equal to the intrinsic rate of growth of the resource if congestion eﬀects are
negligible in the sense that carrying capacity were very large relative to the current stock”. Moreover, our
law of motion helps to privilege economic concerns over pure biological considerations. Laws of motion
similar to that used in our work may be found in Mourmouras (1991; 1993), López (1994) and Koskela
et al. (2002).
2We abstract from labor as an explicit factor of production because it is assumed inelastically supplied.
6NKi(t),w eg e t
Y (t)=AK
β (t)(z (t)Q(t))
1−β .( 3 )
The eﬃciency parameter A represents the constant technological level and β is the
elasticity of output with respect to physical capital. Production function shows constant
returns to scale over all factors, but diminishing returns to K (t) and Q(t) taken isolatedly.
We ignore harvesting costs and, consequently, total output Y (t) may be allocated either
to aggregate consumption or to physical capital accumulation.3 For the sake of simplicity,





1−β − Nc(t).( 4 )
The socially eﬃcient resource allocation problem for this economy, given a constant
social intertemporal discount rate ρ>0, consists in choosing the controls c(t) and z(t)









s.t. (2) and (4), (P1)
for K(0) = K0 > 0 and Q(0) = Q0 > 0 given.
We assume that δ>ρfor positive long-run growth to arise, as we shall see below.
Now, removing time subscripts from variables, the current value Hamiltonian associated
Each agent is endowed with a ﬁx e dq u a n t i t yo fw o r ke ﬀort, which we normalize to one, and consequently
it may be considered as included in the constant term of the production function.
3Stiglitz (1980) points out that natural resouces require human activity to extract and convert them
into a useful form. Therefore, extraction costs are usually modelled as reducing the amount of output
available for consumption and investment. However, according to Plourde (1970), we assume that har-
vesting costs are negligible, an assumption which is innocuous in the study of the eﬃcient solution. As
we show in the main text, it does not impose any limitation on the scope of the optimization problem,
which retains its dynamic formulation and allows for well-deﬁned interior solutions.
4We specify the optimization problem without the static control constraints 0 6 z 6 1.A c c o r d i n g l y ,
we will obtain unconstrained trajectories but, later on, we identify suﬃcient conditions on parameters
which ensure that optimal values are interior.
7with the previous dynamic optimization problem may be written as
H










+ ϑ2 [(δ − (1 + δ)z)Q],
where ϑ1 and ϑ2 are the co-state variables (social shadow prices) associated with K and Q,
respectively. Then, the socially optimal solution arises from the set of ﬁrst order necessary
conditions supplied by the Pontryagin’s maximum principle,
c
−σ = ϑ1,( 5 )
ϑ1 (1 − β)AK
βz
−βQ
−β = ϑ2 (1 + δ),( 6 )
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Q.( 1 0 )
The boundary conditions are K0 and Q0,a n d
lim
t→∞ϑ1K exp{−ρt} =0 ,( 1 1 )
lim
t→∞ϑ2Qexp{−ρt} =0 .( 1 2 )
Given concavity properties of the involved functions, the ﬁrst order conditions are also
suﬃcient for a maximum. According to (5), on the margin, ﬁnal good has to be socially
equal valued in its two uses: consumption and physical capital accumulation. Moreover,
given that consumption cannot be inﬁnite at a ﬁnite date, it implies that ϑ1 6=0at any
ﬁnite t. According to (6), at equilibrium, the social value of the marginal productivity
of natural resource (when harvested) has to be equal to the social value of its marginal
contribution to natural capital accumulation (when saved). This equation also implies
that ϑ1 6=0at any ﬁnite t, provided the economy starts with ﬁnite and strictly positive
endowments of physical and natural capital. The Euler equation (7) states that the
8marginal productivity of physical capital (the beneﬁt of delaying consumption) equals




substituting (6) into (8), we ﬁnd that the intrinsic rate of growth of natural resource (the
social marginal beneﬁt of no harvesting) has to be equal to its social marginal opportunity




ϑ2.T h i si sam o d i ﬁed version of the Hotelling rule, which imposes intertemporal
eﬃciency to the resource extraction activities.
















.( 1 4 )
Substituting these expressions in (7)-(10) we obtain the dynamic system
•







1 ,( 1 5 )
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2 K − Nϑ
− 1
σ






















> 0. These equations, together with the initial conditions K0
and Q0, and the transversality conditions (11) and (12), make the equilibrium dynamics
completely determined over time.
2.2 Closed-form solution
The complete closed-form solution for the variables appearing in the dynamic system
(15)-(18), as well as for the controls of the model, may be found recursively according to
the following procedure. First, take (16) and integrate directly to obtain
ϑ2 = ϑ2(0)exp{−(δ − ρ)t},( 1 9 )
9where ϑ2(0) has still to be determined. Second, substitute the result (19) into (15), which



























,( 2 0 )
where ϑ1(0) and ϑ2(0) have still to be determined. Third, substitute the results (19)
and (20) into (17), which gives us a linear diﬀerential equation in K with variable time-
dependent coeﬃcients,
•
K = ψ1(t)K −ψ2(t). This equation may be integrated and solved
giving us the needed result for our fourth step. This consists in substituting all the
previous results, including the solution for K, into (18) and solving the so obtained
linear diﬀerential equation in Q with a variable non-homogeneous coeﬃcient,
•
Q = δQ −
ψ3(t). The solution to these two linear diﬀerential equations are explicitly derived in the
Appendix by making use of the Gaussian Hypergeometric function 2F1(a,b;c;z),w i t h
complex arguments a, b, c and z.









where (x)n is the Pochhammer rising factorial symbol. The latter may also be deﬁned in






0 tx+n−1 e−t dt
R ∞
0 tx−1 e−t dt
.
When Re(c) > Re(b) > 0 the Gauss hypergeometric function admits the Euler integral
representation in the whole complex plane, cut along the real axis from 1 to ∞,
2F1(a,b,c;z)=
Γ(c)




b−1 (1 − t)
c−b−1 (1 − tz)
−a dt,
which gives the analytic continuation of the series representation beyond the unit circle
deﬁned by |z| < 1. Notice that while the series representation is practical for numerical
computations, the Euler integral representation is particularly suitable for our analytical
study.
10Next, we supply the socially optimal results for all the quantity-variables (states and
controls) of the model.
Proposition 1 Any particular non-explosive solution to the dynamic system (15)-(18)
has to satisfy the initial conditions K0 and Q0, as well as the limiting conditions (11) and
(12). These ones impose the constraints:
δβ − δσ − βρ < 0, (21)
































Proof. See Appendix. ¥
Proposition 2 Under the social optimality conditions, if (21)-(24) hold then:







































(ii) this optimal path shows transitional dynamics, approaching asymptotically to the


























Proof. See Appendix. ¥
11Proposition 3 Under the social optimality conditions, if (21)-(24) hold then:














(ii) this optimal path shows transitional dynamics, approaching asymptotically to the


















Proof. See Appendix. ¥
Proposition 4 Under the social optimality conditions, if (21)-(24) hold and δ>ρthen:
(i) it does exist a unique, interior and monotonous path for the extraction or harvesting
rate
0 <z= −

















δ(1 − σ) − ρ
σ(1 + δ)
< 1; (30)











Proof. From (14), given (19), (20), (25) and (27) we get (29). Then, taking the
limit as t tends to inﬁnity we obtain (30). Uniqueness is a property of these trajectories
which is inherited from the previous Propositions. Monotonicity of z comes from the
monotonicity of the ratio 2F1(t)/
∼
2F1(t), which has been proved in Boucekkine and Ruiz-
Tamarit (2005), Lemma 1. Moreover,
−
z is strictly interior for δ>ρbecause of (22) and
σ>0. The interiority of z(0) comes from (22), which ensures the lower bound, and
12the iﬀ condition in (iii), which under (24) guarantees the upper bound. Finally, given
that z follows a monotonous convergent trajectory, the interiority of this one is a direct
consequence of the interiority of both z(0) and
−
z. ¥
Proposition 5 Under the social optimality conditions, if (21)-(24) hold then:






































(ii) this optimal path shows transitional dynamics, approaching asymptotically to the






















Proof. Given (13) and (20) we get (31), and taking the limit as t tends to inﬁnity we
obtain (32). Uniqueness and positivity are two properties of these trajectories because of
the parameter constraints of the model. ¥
From previous Propositions,5 we can directly deduce the following corollaries, which
translate in terms of the aggregate production level, the relative shadow prices and the
ratio between capital stocks, the results just proved.
5It must be emphasized that all these results are absolutely general in the sense that they encompass
three diﬀerent subcases arising from the relationship between the two parameters representing the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ, and the physical capital share, β. These subcases have
d r a w ng r e a ta t t e n t i o ni ng r o w t hliterature because they cause diﬀerent patterns of dynamic behaviour.
However, what we supply here is a compact general solution for all of them based on the Gauss Hyper-
geometric function, with arguments a>1,
∼
a>0 and c>2 because of the parameter constraints (21)
and (22) implied by transversality conditions and b T 0 depending on σ T β.
13Corollary 1 Under the social optimality conditions, if (21)-(24) hold then:














































(ii) this optimal path shows transitional dynamics, approaching asymptotically to the
























Proof.G i v e n t h a t Y = AKβz1−βQ1−β, Propositions 2, 3 and 4 and some additional
algebra suﬃc et op r o v et h i sc o r o l l a r y .¥
Corollary 2 Under the social optimality conditions, if (21)-(24) hold then:
(i) it does exist a unique and positive path for the relative prices ϑ1
ϑ2 a n dau n i q u e ,
















































































(ii) these optimal paths move asymptotically showing transitional dynamics, and con-

























Proof. Taking (19) and (20) on the one hand, (25) and (27) on the other, and dividing
between them we get (35) and (36), respectively. Then, taking respectively the limit as
t tends to inﬁnity we derive (37) and, using (24), also (38). Finally, given the parameter
constraints of the model, uniqueness and positivity are both properties characterizing
these trajectories. ¥
In short, we ﬁnd that the optimal behavior places the economy on the unique non-
explosive path, which in turn converges to a unique balanced growth path. The short-run
optimal levels for all the endogenous variables show transitional dynamics with conver-
gence to their corresponding long-run optimal levels. This feature is also shared by the
short-run rates of growth, which along the transition converge to a constant long-run rate
of growth,
δ−ρ
σ for K, Q, Y and c and zero for z,
ϑ1
ϑ2 and K
Q. The diﬀerence between long-
run and short-run trajectories may be checked by comparing their corresponding initial
values, which are substantially diﬀerent. The initial value of the long-run trajectories of
K, Q, Y and c are related to the initial value of the short-run ones, i.e. the initial condi-
tions in the case of K and Q, by a multiplicative term which depends simultaneously on
both K0 and Q0, as well as on the structural parameters of the model. The initial value
of the long-run trajectories of z,
ϑ1
ϑ2 and K
Q are independent of K0 and Q0.
Along the balanced growth path, the optimal long-run rate of growth of K, Q, Y
and c is determined endogenously and depends positively on the intrinsic rate of growth
of the natural resource out of harvesting activities, δ. Moreover, the lower the social
discount rate ρ and the higher the patience of agents σ−1, the higher the long-run rate
of growth. Nevertheless, this one appears upper-bounded because of the transversality
condition which introduces the constraint
δ−ρ
σ <δ . Consequently, although the model
predicts an endogenously determined positive long-run rate of growth, this one appears
limited by the biological rate of reproduction (regeneration), which is given exogenously.
The balanced growth path also implies an optimal rate of harvesting
−
z,w h i c hi s
15constant and depends positively on both the social discount rate and the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. However, it depends positively on the intrinsic
rate of growth of the natural resource if and only if σ>1+ρ, otherwise the relationship
is non-positive. Another endogenous variable that is constant along the balanced growth
path is K
Q, which depends positively on ρ, σ and A, but shows an ambiguous link with δ.
There is also an interesting long-run relationship among endogenous variables. The
optimal value of the long-run rate of growth is directly proportional to the diﬀerence
between (i) the maximum harvesting rate which is compatible with a non-decreasing
stock of natural resource, zs ≡ δ
1+δ,a n d(ii) the optimal value of the long-run harvesting
rate,
−
z. According to this, positive long-run growth is sustainable as long as
−
z<z S.
Namely, condition δ>ρ , which ensures a positive rate of growth, also implies that the
harvesting rate is lower than δ
1+δ. Moreover, given that zS is increasing with the intrinsic
rate of growth δ, exogenous elements aﬀecting this one, such as government ecologically-
based interventions, may have an important positive impact on the margins for growth.
In particular, we ﬁnd that an increase in δ that expands the margins for sustainability
because increases zS and reduces
−
z,6 has an additional positive eﬀect increasing the long-
run rate of growth.
In previous paragraphs, including Propositions and Corollaries, we have assumed δ>
ρ. However, as Clark (1973) and Clark and Munro (1978) point out, if the own rate of
interest of the resource stock is less than the discount rate, which corresponds here to
ρ>δ , then the extinction of the natural resource becomes an optimal policy.7 In such a
6As we have shown, if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is low enough, an increase in δ
increases
−
z, but less than proportionally to the increase in zS.
7Beddington et al. (1975) shows that a large social discount rate means that the central planner is
less willing to sacriﬁce current proﬁts in order to conserve his resources, and in the limit he is not at
all interested in conservation. His harvesting strategy is then the same as that of the individual agent
in an open access regime and, acting on his own, he has no power to conserve the resource whether he
wants to or not. In general, Smith (1969), Beddington et al. (1975) or Leung and Wang (1976) consider
that the danger of intentional extinction depends on the evolution of the market value (selling price), the
operating costs and the eﬃciency of harvesting technology, as well as on the size of the natural resource
16case, the long-run optimal harvesting rate given in (30) is strictly interior if σ>ρ −δ>0,
and the long-run value of Q given in (28) tends to zero.
After having characterized the ﬁrst-best solution, showing that an optimal exploitation
of the renewable natural resource in both senses intra and inter-temporally, can produce
sustained positive long-run growth, we will now study the behavior of the economy in a
decentralized competitive environment.
3 The resources allocation in the decentralized com-
petitive economy
3.1 The standard open access model
First of all, we shall remind the lessons from the well-known model for a decentralized
economy without governmental regulation and open access to the renewable natural re-
source. Under open access there is a lack of any kind of property rights or ownership of
the resource, which is a free good for individuals but scarce for society. Thus, no one can
prevent another from using the natural resource and appropriating a share of its returns.
In the open access context, there is an incentive for potential entrants to join the indus-
try, and for already installed ﬁrms to expand their capacity in order to capture increased
rents. Instead, no one has particular incentive to take into account the dynamics of the
natural resource at the aggregate level. Individual harvesters ﬁnd not a motive for in-
vesting (saving) in stock maintenance since they fail to take account of its full user cost.
Therefore, they do not consider the impact of their current harvesting decisions on the
size of the future stock.
According to the literature, two main results can be expected. First, rivalry in harvest-
ing, which plays the role of a negative externality, will cause exhaustion of the resource, as
in the famous article by Hardin (1968). Second, resource extraction will continue until all
economic rents are dissipated, as Gordon (1954) shows in his open access ﬁshery model. In
stock.
17the competitive model with resource exploitation under open access, harvesting costs may
be relevant because, as Smith (1968) shows, the presence of increasing extraction costs
may prevent the exhaustion of the resource. Namely, the existence of negative stock ex-
ternalities provides a mechanism that, as long as harvesting depletes the stock and rises
harvesting costs, ceteris paribus discourages harvesting itself. However, Smith (1969),
Gould (1972), Berck (1979), and Brander and Taylor (1998) show that if the minimum
size of the natural resource at which exploitation is proﬁtable is lower than the minimum
biologically viable size, the open access regime implies over-exploitation and (eventually)
the exhaustion or extinction of the natural resource.8
The impossibility for long-run growth and socially eﬃcient resource management in
the open access system are both consequence of a market failure. The market sends
out incorrect signals to the harvesters of the resource and, consequently, it results in
ineﬃcient outcomes.9 Incompleteness or total absence of well-deﬁned property rights
l e a dt om a r k e tf a i l u r e sa n dc r e a t ee c o n o m i ca sw e l la sb i o l o g i c a lp r o b l e m s . I no r d e rt o
s o l v es u c hm a r k e tf a i l u r e s ,o t h e rt h a nt h ep o l i tical process which give birth to a property
rights system by implementing individual transferable quotas (ITQ), there are two main
regulatory options. First, input or eﬀort controls which address to the problem by making
it diﬃcult for harvesters to respond to the incorrect market signals. Usually, these take
8Some pioneering work [Munro (1979), Levhari and Mirman (1980)], assuming that the interaction
of agents has the structure of a repeated game, shown that it is possible for cooperation to emerge in
the open access context. The idea is interesting because if harvesters cooperate the tendency towards
resource depletion can be avoided. Unfortunately, repeated games do not capture the structure of most
natural resource harvesting in real life, where payoﬀs to players depend critically on the size of the relevant
resource stock. In addition to the existence of stock externalities, the mapping of strategies to payoﬀs
changes from period to period, which places this kind of games in the category of dynamic games. Until
now, however, the few attempts which have been made to design realistic dynamic models for natural
resource exploitation under open access regimes seem little fruitful (Brown, 2000).
9T h eo p e na c c e s ss y s t e mi sc l e a r l yd i ﬀerent from the common property regime in which a group of
owners control for the resorce and exclude others from using it. Although the collective self-management
by individuals may not result in fully eﬃcient outcomes, it could preserve the resource from exhaustion
by enhancing its rental value [Bulte et al. (1995), Brown (2000)]
18the form of constraints on the size and number of harvesters as well as of limits over
time and areas for harvesting. Second, output controls which face up to the problem by
changing the market signals themselves. Wide evidence demonstrates that input controls
are essentially inadequate because they cause overcapitalization and do not avoid ﬁshing
races. Hence, the only real option is output controls which may adopt two basic forms:
taxes and harvesting quotas (TAC). Along the next section we analyze agents behavior
in a decentralized competitive economy when a tax on the resource use is introduced.10
3.2 The regulated competitive economy
From now on, the renewable natural resource will be considered as an essential input for
production which is treated as a private good because it shares the properties of rivalry
and excludability with the remaining inputs. Although for the sake of simplicity the
model considers costless harvesting, there is not open access to the natural capital stock
because ﬁrms have to pay for the use of such a resource. There are N ﬁxed ﬁrms, as many
as households, which freely adjust their Ki and zi values trying to capture quasi-rents.
Each competitive ﬁrm pays a unit price q and ignores the dynamics of Q. We assume, as
before, that there are no depreciation charges. Under these assumptions, each ﬁrm solves
the static optimization problem11
max
{Ki,zi}
πi = F(Ki,z iQ) − rKi − qziQ = AK
β
i (ziQ)
1−β − rKi − qziQ,( F )
where r represents the market interest rate and the opportunity cost for physical capital.
The positive price q represents a unit tax that individual ﬁrms pay to the government,
revealing that natural resource is scarce. The rental prices for both types of capital
services satisfy the ﬁrst order necessary conditions
r = FK(Ki,z iQ)=βAK
β−1
i (ziQ)
1−β ,( 3 9 )
10Clark (1980) proves that, if harvesting quotas are freely transferable, the quota system will have the
same eﬀects in eﬃciency terms as taxes.
11The absence of extraction costs has not negative consequences for a well-deﬁned interior solution.
Consequently, we specify the optimization problem without the static control constraints 0 6 Nzi 6 1,
which are obviously satisﬁed by unconstrained solution trajectories.
19q = F2(Ki,z iQ)=( 1− β)AK
β
i (ziQ)
−β .( 4 0 )
Given the assumption of constant returns to scale, output exactly exhausts by paying
inputs according to their marginal productivities. Hence, rKi + qziQ = Yi and economic
rents πi are zero.
The problem facing the representative price-taker household, given a constant in-
tertemporal discount rate ρ>0, consists in choosing the control c ∀t ≥ 0, which solves











Ki = rKi + Ti − c,( H )
Ki(0) = Ki0 > 0.
In the dynamic budget constraint, the term Ti represents transfers from the govern-
ment that are treated as lump-sum by households. The ﬁrst order necessary conditions
are
c
−σ = µ1,( 4 1 )
•
µ1 =( ρ − r)µ1,( 4 2 )
•
Ki = rKi + Ti − c.( 4 3 )
The boundary conditions are Ki0 and
lim
t→∞µ1Ki exp{−ρt} =0 .( 4 4 )
On the other hand, the amount of tax receipts are assumed to be equal to the amount
of lump-sum transfers to households, in such a way that government is constrained with
a period-by-period balanced budget
N X
i=1






Q.( 4 5 )
We consider a benevolent government, choosing q and T such that the induced al-
locations maximize agent’s utility, subject to the constraint that ﬁnal allocations must
20be consistent with the (decentralized) competitive equilibrium under regulation.12 The
government takes now into account the explicit dynamics of Q, as given in (2). The
dynamic Ramsey problem for this economy consists in a policymaker maximizing the
aggregate welfare subject to: (i) the ﬁrst order conditions from both the household and
the ﬁrm maximization problems, (ii) the government budget constraint, and (iii) the










s. t. (39)-(45), (2), (4) and K0, Q0 > 0.( G )
Constraints (39)-(45), after some substitutions and the solution of a linear diﬀerential
equation in the product µ1K, under the transversality condition (44), may be summarized











−ρtdt = µ1 (0)K0,( 4 6 )
where µ1 (0) comes from the solution to the household problem (H). According to Chari
and Kehoe (1999), the implementability condition represents the intertemporal budget
constraint of either the consumer or the government, where the consumer and ﬁrm ﬁrst
order conditions have been used to substitute out the prices and policies. Consequently,
we can use the primal approach for solving this Ramsey problem where, instead of choos-
ing the tax paths, the government will choose the set of allocations and shadow prices that
maximize consumers’ utility subject to the implementability and feasibility constraints;
namely, the allocations that can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium with distor-
tionary taxes. The current value Hamiltonian associated with this dynamic optimization
problem is
H
c(K,Q,θ1,θ 2,η,c,z;σ,N,A,β,δ,t ≥ 0) =
12The government makes its policy choice under full commitment: policy rules are announced and,
then, the government is not allowed to revising the path of ﬁscal instruments over time. According to


















+ θ2 [(δ − (1 + δ)z)Q] − ηµ1 (0)K0,
where θ1 and θ2 are the co-state variables (shadow prices) associated with K and Q,a n d
η is a constant over time multiplier associated with the integral constraint. The set of











−σ = θ1,( 4 7 )
θ1 (1 − β)AK
βz
−βQ





−σ = θ2 (1 + δ),( 4 8 )
•
θ1 = ρθ1 − θ1βAK
β−1z
1−βQ




−σ,( 4 9 )
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Q,( 5 2 )
together with the static constraint (46) or implementability condition, the initial condi-
tions K0 and Q0, and the transversality conditions
lim
t→∞θ1K exp{−ρt} =0 ,( 5 3 )
lim
t→∞θ2Qexp{−ρt} =0 .( 5 4 )
Equations (47)-(54), plus (46) and initial conditions, determine a second-best Ramsey
allocation. However, we will not study existence and uniqueness issues, nor will we try to
get the closed-form solution to the resulting nonlinear dynamic system, as we did before
with the previous models. Instead, here we assume that such a solution exists and focus
on the problem of the existence of an optimal tax structure, allowing to implement the
Pareto optimal allocation as a taxed competitive equilibrium.
Comparing the above ﬁrst order necessary conditions with (5)-(12), we observe that
they are equal except for the presence of η, which comes from the pseudo-utility function
22that replaces the utility function in the primal approach to the Ramsey problem. There-
fore, as in Yuen (1991), the second-best problem reduces to the socially eﬃcient ﬁrst-best
problem when the constant multiplier associated with the implementability condition is
zero. Under η =0 , the shadow prices of both the physical capital stock and the natural
resource stock appearing in the Ramsey problem, are equal to their corresponding social
shadow prices: θ1 = ϑ1 and θ2 = ϑ2.13
Now, we can derive the particular solution trajectories for the tax-price associated with
the use of the natural resource and the lump-sum transfer, which represent the Ramsey
policy consistent with the ﬁrst-best solution to the Ramsey problem (G).
Proposition 6 In the decentralized competitive economy, the ﬁrst-best allocations may
be implemented under government regulation by setting the tax-price q and the lump-sum























































































⎝1 − σ +
σ ((1 − β)A)
1
β


























which tell us that the bigger is η the larger the divergence between (regulated) competitive and social
shadow prices.
23Proof. From (40) and (45), simply by substituting (25), (27) and (29), which show the
ﬁrst-best trajectories for involved variables, we get (55) and (56), respectively. To derive
q(0) and T(0) we also use (24). ¥
Corollary 3 Trajectories for q and T show transitional dynamics. The tax-price q con-
verges asymptotically to the constant value
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Proof.T a k i n g t h e l i m i t a s t tends to inﬁnity in (55) and (56) leads to (57) and
(58), respectively. Moreover, the second one may also be proved using the relationship
−
T =( 1− β)
−
Y and (34). ¥
Initially T(0) = q(0)z(0)Q0 but, as the economy develops, q t e n d st o( 5 7 )a sl o n g
as z converges to (30), even if Q moves approaching (28). The optimal dynamic tax
continuously changes as the state of the economy evolves toward the balanced growth path.
I nt h el o n g - r u n ,t h eu n i tt a x - p r i c eq tends to a constant value, though the aggregate lump-
sum transfer T converges to a growing path because of the endogenous optimal long-run
growth. The aggregate lump-sum transfer always represents a ﬁxed proportion of total
output, T =( 1 − β)Y , given by the natural resource share. Over time, the diﬀerent
values of q make private agents to correctly evaluate the scarcity of the natural resource
stock and decide according to the true social costs, while T plays a subsidiary role giving
levied resources back to the economy in a way that implies a redistribution from ﬁrms to
consumers. Both together contribute to correct the bad eﬀects from the absence of a usual
market for the natural resource as a factor of production, i.e. they internalize all beneﬁts
and costs associated with the harvesting activity. Moreover, the ﬁrst-best Ramsey policy
24is unique given the uniqueness of trajectories (55) and (56), which in turn arise from the
uniqueness of the ﬁrst-best allocations. Finally, taking (57) and substituting for ξ we get
−





1−β, which means that in the long-run the government has to ﬁxa
higher unit tax-price as smaller is the intrinsic growth rate of the natural resource, and
as greater is the production eﬃciency level in the ﬁnal-good sector. Along the transition,
q converges to
−














4C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have shown that an economy which produces a ﬁnal good using physi-
cal capital and some harvested quantity of a renewable natural resource may experience
sustained long-run growth. Using the Gauss Hypergeometric special function we got the
short- and long-run closed-form trajectories for all the variables in levels. We identiﬁed
uniqueness and convergence, although not necessarily in a monotonous way, as the main
properties of such trajectories. Pareto eﬃcient results reveal that under eﬃcient man-
agement of the natural resource there exists an interior optimal harvesting rate which
allows for positive long-run optimal growth. However, this rate of growth appears upper-
bounded by the intrinsic rate of growth of the natural resource. Namely, endogenous
economic growth is limited by exogenous biological reproduction. Moreover, intentional
exhaustion of the natural resource and long-run economic collapse could also be optimal
for a high enough social discount rate. In such a case, a very impatient society is not
willing to sacriﬁce current proﬁts and shows no interest in conservation.
When we study the behavior of the economy organized in a decentralized competitive
way, the open access regime in which there are rivalry in harvesting and no excludability
from the use of the natural resource leads to over-exploitation and exhaustion. The
absence of well-deﬁned property rights represents a market failure which causes the above
ineﬃcient outcomes making sustained long-run growth unfeasible. Then, choosing among
diﬀerent instruments for government intervention (ITQ’s, input or eﬀort controls, TAC’s
and taxes) we decided to analyze regulation by means of a unit tax that ﬁrms have to
25pay for the use of the resource. In this case, natural resource is rival and excludable
(private good) and government distributes all its receipts to households under the form
of lump-sum transfers. An example of this may be found in Alaska where the government
collects taxes from oil extraction (a non-renewable resource) and then they are equally
distributed to citizens.
We solved a dynamic Ramsey problem, which usually determines second-best alloca-
tions, and chose among its solutions the unique Ramsey policy which allows the compet-
itive economy to reach the ﬁrst-best solution. This is an uncommon result arising from
the fact that the original distortion consists in the absence of a well-deﬁned market for
the natural resource harvesting activity, which is replenished by a benevolent government
with the suitable ﬁscal policy. We have shown that regulation may prevent from resource
over-exploitation and exhaustion. Moreover, one important lesson from this paper is that
in the short-run the unit tax on the resource use must be variable according to the evo-
lution of the economy’ state towards the balanced growth path. In the long-run, the
corresponding constant unit tax has to be higher as lower is the intrinsic rate of repro-
duction in the natural resource sector and as higher is the productivity (eﬃciency level)
in the ﬁnal-good sector.
F i n a l l y ,w ew a n tt op o i n to u tt h a tt h eo p t i m a lu n i tt a xs t u d i e di nt h i sp a p e ri sn o t
implemented, stricto sensu, as an eco-tax because the lump-sum compensations are not
ecologically oriented. In general, eco-taxes are intended to achieve a speciﬁc ecological ef-
fect and, consequently, the revenue derived from the eco-tax should not become part of the
general budget but should be speciﬁcally targeted. In our context, this would mean that
the above revenues should ﬁnance governmental ecologically-based interventions aimed
at increasing the intrinsic rate of growth of the natural resource. Given the existence of
a biological constraint on the long-run rate of economic growth, this is very important
because any increase in reproduction or regeneration rates will have a signiﬁcant positive
impact on the margins for sustained growth as well as on the long-run rate of growth
itself. However, this matter is beyond the scope of the paper and it has been left to one
side for future research.
265 Appendix: proof of Propositions 1-3
Substitute (19) and (20) into (17) and get the linear diﬀerential equation
•
K = ψ1(t)K −








































































The general solution is































































































(1 − β)(δβ − δσ − βρ)





The value of the integral in the solution trajectory for K, using the Gauss Hypergeo-























































δβ − δσ − βρ
σδ(1 − β)
, b = −
β − σ
σ(1 − β)
, c = a +1=1−
δβ − δσ − βρ
σδ(1 − β)
.
Now, looking for a particular solution trajectory, we consider the transversality con-
dition lim
t→∞ϑ1K exp{−ρt} =0 . Using (20) and the solution for K just obtained, for any
ϑ1(0) and ϑ2(0) ﬁnite and diﬀerent from zero and given that 2F1(0) i sc o n s t a n ta n di nt h e
limit as t tends to inﬁnity 2F1(∞)= 2 F1 (a,b;c;0)=1, this boundary condition holds if
and only if

























δβ − δσ − βρ
=0 ,
which correspond to (21) and (23) respectively. Finally, substituting these ones in the
above general solution for K we get (25) and, taking the limit as t tends to inﬁnity, (26).
On other hand, substituting (19), (20) and the previous solution for K into (18), we
get the linear diﬀerential equation
•


























The general solution is
























According to Boucekkine and Ruiz-Tamarit (2005), the integral at the end of the

































































a = a − 1=−
δβ(1 − σ) − βρ
σδ(1 − β)
.
Once again, to ﬁnd a particular solution trajectory we have to consider the transver-
sality condition, lim
t→∞ϑ2Qexp{−ρt} =0 . Using (19) and the previous solution for Q,f o r
any ϑ1(0) and ϑ2(0) ﬁnite and diﬀerent from zero and given that
∼























which correspond to (22) and (24) respectively. Finally, substituting these ones in the
general solution for Q we get (27) and, taking the limit as t tends to inﬁnity, (28).
Conditions (23) and (24) make up a system of two equations with two unknowns,
ϑ1(0) and ϑ2(0). Their values are determined in the following way: (24) determines a
unique value for the ratio
ϑ1(0)
ϑ2(0), then (23) determines the value of ϑ2(0),w h i c ha f t e r
multiplying by the value of the ratio itself gives the value of ϑ1(0). In Boucekkine and
Ruiz-Tamarit (2005) it is shown, with a nonlinear system very close to (23)-(24) with the
inequality constraints (21) and (22), that solutions for ϑ1(0) and ϑ2(0) a r eu n i q u ea n d




Q as given in (25)-(28) are also unique
and positive.
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